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Highlights
•This is the first empirical study to uncover a number of configurations of buyer-supplier
relationships, leading to a kind exit.
•Counter to extant thinking, buyer-supplier relationships that do not display relational
properties can also lead to a kind exit.
•We disentangle the role of dependence and its interaction with other buyer-supplier
relationship characteristics leading to a kind exit.

Abstract
Research shows that the choice of relationship exit strategy by the instigator of exit can have
significant negative consequences for the party that is being dropped. In this study we focus on what
we coin as kind exit, where the risk of harm to the supplier as a result of the buyer's relationship
termination is low. In line with current research, which is suggesting that the characteristics of a buyersupplier relationship play a critical role in the instigator's choice of exit strategy, we examine the link
between the buyer's perception of its relationship with the supplier and the manner in which the
buyer-supplier relationship ends. We posit that this phenomenon is causally complex and context
dependent, and as such, there will be multiple types of buyer-supplier relationships that will lead to a
kind exit. To uncover these types, we examine 315 terminated buyer-supplier relationships in
manufacturing and service sectors in the UK, employing fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA). Our results show that contrary to extant literature, there is not one relationship type that
leads to a kind exit; instead, we uncover four alternative equifinal configurations of relationship
dimensions and two exogenous factors.

Keywords
Buyer-supplier relationships, Relationship exit, Transaction cost economics, Social exchange theory,
fsQCA, Configurations

1. Introduction
Effective management of buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs) is a cornerstone of a firm's competitive
advantage (Zaefarian, Thiesbrummel, Henneberg, & Naudé, 2017). Depending upon firms' specific
needs, buyers and suppliers form relationships that vary across multiple dimensions, such as duration,
closeness and commitment (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Ganesan, 1994). Business circumstances, firms'
needs, behaviors and performance of actors in a relationship change over time, and when this
happens, it is not uncommon for a firm to re-evaluate the value they are getting from a relationship.
While sometimes this re-evaluation results in the adjustment of the relationship – e.g. a decrease or
increase in resource commitment, an alternative option is to end the relationship.
While in some cases the ending of a relationship is predetermined and agreed in advance by both the
buyer and the supplier (e.g. at the end of a project, or after the realization of mutual objectives),
research shows that in about 50% of the cases, relationship exit is triggered unilaterally by one party
(Gulati, Sytch, & Mehrotra, 2008; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). Mismanagement of relationship exit can
have devastating and far-reaching implications for both companies. While relationship exit can be

initiated by either the buyer or the supplier at any point during the relationship (Ryan & Tähtinen,
2012), studies indicate that exit, when not managed correctly, can bring operational disruptions,
reputational damage, financial losses and even bankruptcy, and that the party that being dropped is
usually more vulnerable than the instigator of the exit (Alajoutsijärvi, Möller, & Tähtinen, 2000; Gulati
et al., 2008; Pressey & Mathews, 2003). An example of an organization suffering the damaging effects
of relationship exit is Sames, an American paint application OEM. Sames entered a strategic
partnership with a large Japanese car manufacturer, only to be dropped unexpectedly after years of
investment in R&D, trial runs and attempts to adapt to the automaker's mounting demands, ultimately
resulting in the supplier's bankruptcy (Gulati et al., 2008).
Research into buyer-supplier relationships to date, has tended to focus on the front end of these
relationships, i.e. the initial engagement and development of a relationship. Meanwhile limited
attention has been devoted to the final stage, where parties disengage from a relationship; notable
exceptions include Alajoutsijärvi et al. (2000), Pressey and Mathews (2003), Gulati et al. (2008); Ryan
and Tähtinen (2012). The intent of our study is to investigate the link between the buyer's perception
of its relationship with the supplier, and the manner in which the buyer-supplier relationship ends once
the buyer has decided to disengage from it. In particular, we are interested in what we call kind exit,
which refers to a relationship dissolution where the likelihood of negative operational, reputational
and financial damages for the supplier is low. This, we argue, depends on whether the buyer: a) clearly
communicates the exit decision to the supplier in a way that reduces the ambiguity about the
relationship's continuation; and b) offers the supplier an opportunity to negotiate exit provisions, such
as resource re-deployment or knowledge and technology transfers (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Baxter,
1985).
Based on experience from practice and suggestions from the extant literature (Alajoutsijärvi et al.,
2000; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen, Blois, & Mittilä, 2007), we posit that the buyer's perception
of its relationship with the supplier will play a role in how the relationship ends. To fully describe a
buyer-supplier relationship, we adopt four relationship dimensions/characteristics from Transaction
Costs Economics (TCE) – asset specificity, opportunistic behavior, administrative control and
transaction uncertainty, and four from Social Exchange Theory (SET) – trust, information sharing,
flexibility and dependence. When it comes to relationship exit strategies, we adopt Baxter's
(1985) relationship disengagement model. To examine this link empirically, we collect and analyze
cross-sectorial data from 315 terminated buyer-supplier relationships in the UK.
In addition to treating buyer-supplier relationships and relationship exit as multi-dimensional, we also
adopt a contingency-theoretic, configurational approach (Karatzas, Johnson, & Bastl, 2016). This means
that we are primarily interested in how different dimensions of a BSR interact with each other to form
constellations (Meyer, Tsui & Higgins, 1993) that elicit a kind exit, rather than in the net effects of
individual dimensions. In line with previous empirical studies in the area of industrial relationships
(e.g. Hierati, Hennenberg, Richter, & Harste, 2019; Karatzas et al., 2016; Zaefarian et al., 2017), we
posit, that the relationship between BSR dimensions, contextual factors, and relationship exit is a
causally complex phenomenon. Complex causality has three properties
– conjunction, equifinality and asymmetry (Misangyi et al., 2017), which in this context would mean
that: a) a kind exit will result from the interdependence of multiple conditions rather than have one

single cause (conjunction), b) there will be more than one pathway (i.e. configuration) to a kind exit
(equifinality), c) both the presence and the absence of some attributes may be connected to the
outcome as part of different, equifinal configurations (asymmetry). We specifically adopt fsQCA –
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis – which is an analytical technique equipped to tackle
complex causality (see Fiss, 2011; Misangyi et al., 2017; Ragin, 2008).
This study makes the following contributions: Our first, contribution is to show that the influences of
relationship dimensions on kind exit are causally complex. We empirically uncovered four
configurations of dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships and contextual factors that lead to the
same outcome – a kind relationship exit. Our second contribution reveals that contrary to the current
suggestions in the literature (e.g. Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Giller & Matear, 2001; Halinen & Tähtinen,
2002), buyer-supplier relationships that do not display relational properties such as trust, information
sharing, and informality, can still lead to a kind exit, as long as the buyer perceives itself to be
dependent on the supplier. This also clarifies the current confusion in the literature (e.g. Tähtinen et
al., 2007) regarding the role of dependence (and its interaction with relational properties of a buyersupplier relationship) in the choice of an exit strategy that considers the supplier's welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we continue with the theoretical background where we
introduce Baxter's (1985) relationship disengagement model and present the relationship dimensions
grounded in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Social Exchange Theory (SET). This is followed by
the methodology, where we describe the empirical setting, data collection and configurational
analysis. We then present the results and close with the discussion, limitations and directions for
further research.

2. Theoretical background
In this section we present background literature pertinent to our study's focus. It is divided in three
parts: we begin by defining relationship exit and introducing Baxter's (1985) model of relationship
dissolution. This is followed by the introduction of relationship characteristics, grounded in TCE and
SET and the justification for their adoption. In the third part we bring the previous two bodies of
literature together and present the current state of knowledge related to the relationship influences
on BSR exit, which we then summarize in two theoretical conjectures that guided our empirical
investigation.

2.1. Relationship exit and exit strategies
Relationship dissolution is the last stage in the relationship life-cycle (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987), and
it unfolds through the following key steps (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002):
relationship assessment; decision making; dyadic communication, and disengagement. The outcome of
this process is either a total exit from a BSR, where the parties have no intention to continue the
relationship in the future, or a partial exit, where, for example, a buyer terminates the relationship
with one division of the supplier but continues doing business with another (Michalski, 2004). Here, we
focus on total exit, and consider the BSR to end completely when one party (e.g. the buyer) is not
continuing any business with its counterpart (e.g. the supplier).
One of the most critical aspects of relationship ending is the approach – i.e. the exit strategy – that the
disengager adopts once the exit decision has been taken and it is the essence of the third and fourth

step described earlier. While early research suggested that exit strategy is as simple as a buyer ceasing
purchase of goods and services from a supplier (e.g. Helper, 1993; Hirschman, 1970), more recent
works show a considerable complexity in approaches to relationship exit in business (Alajoutsijärvi et
al., 2000; Eckerd & Girth, 2017; Pressey & Mathews, 2003; Tähtinen et al., 2007). To capture this, we
adopted Baxter's (1985) relationship disengagement model. The model was originally empirically
developed in the field of social psychology, and later adopted and applied in the context of businessto-business relationships (e.g. Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Giller & Matear, 2001; Pressey & Qiu,
2007; Ryan & Tähtinen, 2012). It proposes four exit strategies, based on their directness and
orientation: silent, disguised, negotiated and communicated. Table 1 introduces each exit strategy and
their key defining characteristics.

Table 1. Relationship exit strategies.
Directness

Orientation
Other-oriented
Silent Exit Strategy (SES)

Self-oriented
Disguised Exit Strategy (DES)

•Communication of exit decision: No intention or need
•Decision instigated by: Can be unilateral or bilateral if
both parties realize that the relationship has lost its
significance.
•Duration: Disengagement can take a long time.
•Consequences for the disengager: Gives up some of
its own interests.
•Consequences for the partner: Tries to avoid hurting
the partner, however it increases the uncertainty over
the relationship continuation.
Negotiated Exit Strategy (NES)

•Communication of exit decision: No intention to communicate
actual decision and reasons behind it. Exit intentions are
conveyed through disguised tactics by deliberately making the
relationship unsustainable for the other party.
•Decision instigated by: Unilateral by the disengager.
•Duration: Disengagement can take a long time.
•Consequences for the disengager: Secures its own interests.
•Consequences for the partner: Hurt the partner as it does not
consider its interests and increases uncertainty in the
relationship's continuation.
Communicated Exit Strategy (CES)

•Communication of exit decision: directly and
explicitly communicated to the partner.
•Decision instigated by: Can be unilateral or bi-lateral.
•Duration: Opportunity for quick disengagement if
parties agree on terms.
•Consequences for the disengager: Gives up some of
its own interests, and willing to negotiate the terms of
disengagement.
•Consequences for the partner: Avoids hurting the
partner; eliminates ambiguity over the relationship
continuation; gives the partner an opportunity to
negotiate terms of disengagement.
Adapted from Baxter (1985) and Alajoutsijärvi et al. (2000).

•Communication of exit decision: directly and explicit
communicated to the partner.
•Decision instigated by: Unilateral by the disengager.
•Duration: Quick
•Consequences for the disengager: Secures its own interests.
•Consequences for the partner: Hurts the partner as it gives the
partner no opportunity to negotiate terms or save the
relationship; eliminates ambiguity over the relationship
continuation.

Indirect /
uninformed

Direct /
informed

Directness refers to how the disengager communicates the exit decision to its counterpart. Indirect or
uninformed strategies (i.e. silent and disguised), are characterized by the disengager's lack of intention
to communicate the exit decision to its counterpart or by masking the real intentions to exit through
stealth tactics. For example, in the case of a disguised exit strategy, the disengager would use rapid
order changes, pressures for unreasonable price decreases, or increases in service levels as stealth
tactics in order to make the relationship unsustainable and force the supplier out of the relationship
(He, Ghobadian, & Gallear, 2013; Pressey & Selassie, 2007). This lack and/or ambiguity in
communication introduces considerable uncertainty in the relationship regarding its continuation,
often leading to a prolonged disengagement process, and/or the creation of a false sense of certainty
where the supplier is continuously investing in what is ultimately a lost cause. This implies difficulties
for the supplier to ever recover such investment. Direct or informed strategies (i.e. negotiated and
communicated) on the other hand, offer no doubt over the disengager's intentions, since the exit
decision is clearly and explicitly communicated to the counterpart.
Orientation relates to the extent of the disengager's concern over the interests and views of its
counterpart. For example, a supplier could lose a substantial amount of business, be unable to redeploy relationship-specific investments, suffer reputational damage, experience operational
disruptions, etc. In other-oriented strategies, (i.e. silent and negotiated), the disengager considers also
the interests of the counterpart. Both parties offer each other a so called “face-saving opportunity” to
prevent unnecessary confrontation and harm (Baxter, 1985; Epstein & Keller, 2012; Tähtinen &
Vaaland, 2006). This is most evident in the negotiated exit strategy, where, for example, the buyer
besides clearly communicating its exit intentions to the supplier, is also willing to negotiate the terms
of disengagement, with an intent to avoid hostility and mitigate losses (Rutherford, Anaza, & Phillips,
2012). In self-oriented strategies (i.e. disguised and communicated) the disengager's main concern is to
secure its own interests, irrespective of the negative consequences that the exit decision may have for
its counterpart. For example, the buyer can unilaterally decide to terminate the relationship and
inform the supplier about the decision, but this gives the supplier no opportunity to save the
relationship or negotiate exit terms. Although such an approach removes any ambiguity, it will very
likely hurt the supplier and lead to hostility in the disengagement phase of the relationship (Gulati et
al., 2008).
The differences in communication and orientation among the four exit strategies have a variety of
consequences for the disengager and its partner, and inevitably lead to discrepancies between
what Tähtinen et al. (2007) call preferred versus appropriate ways of ending a relationship. While the
two self-oriented exit strategies (disguised and communicated) are economically rational from the
disengager's point of view, they can inflict substantial harm to the supplier, given their unilateral, often
abrupt, confrontational, and self-interested nature. The two other-oriented strategies (silent and
negotiated) may be more appropriate, since the buyer considers the interests of the counterpart as
well (Tähtinen et al., 2007). Moreover, between the two, a negotiated exit strategy is the supplier's
best alternative as it offers an opportunity to negotiate terms and conditions of disengagement (e.g.
process duration, asset redeployment, rate of order de-escalation), while it also removes any
ambiguity over the continuation of the relationship (in contrast to silent strategy). We argue, and
validate empirically through interviews with practitioners, that as we move from a disguised to a
negotiated exit strategy, the likelihood of financial, operational and reputational damages for the

supplier is lower. In other words, the more the buyer's exit strategy resembles a negotiated one, the
less harmful the outcomes of disengagement are likely to be for the supplier, i.e. the kinder the exit.

2.2. Characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships
It is generally accepted that business-to-business relationships are complex and thus characterized by
multiple dimensions (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Vesalainen & Kohtamaki, 2015; Zaefarian et al., 2017).
To capture these dimensions, we adopt two theoretical lenses; Social Exchange Theory and Transaction
Cost Economics. There are three reasons for this adoption:
First, both theoretical lenses have been extensively used to describe BSRs, considering dimensions such
as, long-term orientation, relational norms, governance structures, relationship uncertainty,
adaptation and collaboration (e.g. Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Heide & John, 1992; Hierati et al.,
2019; Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013; Williamson, 2008; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).
Second, the key premise of SET is that positive interactions over time will produce relational exchange
norms (e.g. trust, information sharing and flexibility) that will govern an exchange relationship (Lambe,
Wittmann, & Spekman, 2001), which makes the relationship an effective form of exchange
governance. TCE on the other hand, emphasizes the need for the creation of a formalized governance,
due to the assumption of partners' opportunism which limits the effectiveness of relational governance
postulated by SET (Lambe et al., 2001; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In consequence, SET has a higher
explanatory and predictive power in longer-term, relational relationships, where partners develop
mutual trust and relational norms of behavior, whereas TCE explains short-term, opportunistic
relationships better, where the two parties have to rely on transactional forms of governance. As a
result, and in line with arguments by Nyaga et al. (2013) and Hierati et al. (2019), we argue that the
two theories should be treated as complementary, which is why we adopted both of them to describe
the characteristics of the studied BSRs.
Third, the extant evidence from the relationship exit literature suggests that the characteristics of BSRs,
and specifically the strength of relational bonds (e.g. trust, relational norms, opportunism), the type of
relationship infrastructure (e.g. relationship-specific investments and governance structures) and the
dependence between the buyer and the supplier, will likely influence the choice of relationship exit
strategy (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Giller & Matear, 2001; Halinen & Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen et al.,
2007). Thus, the selected TCE and SET dimensions can holistically describe a BSR characteristics
relevant in the context of relationship exit and are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Relationship dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships.
Theoretical
lens
Transaction
Cost Economic
(TCE)

Determinant

Definition of the determinant

Asset specificity

Asset specificity refers to investments made by a firm that are of
considerably less value outside of the focal relationship (Heide &
John, 1980, p. 27)
Opportunistic behavior involves the deceit-oriented violation of
implicit or explicit promises about one's expected behavior
(Achrol & Gundlach, 1999).

Opportunistic
behavior

Administrative
control

Transaction
uncertainty

Social
Exchange
Theory (SET)

Trust

Information
sharing
Flexibility

Dependence

Administrative control refers to institutional instruments and
governance mechanisms, e.g. formal contracts, that are put in
place by the parties as safeguards, to enable them to establish,
structure, and govern inter–firm exchanges (Andaleeb, 1995).
Transaction uncertainty refers to a difficulty of predicting the
action of another party in terms of product/service availability,
volume stability and buying behavior (Noordewier, John, &
Nevin, 1990).
Inter-organizational trust is defined as expectation that an actor
can be relied on to fulfill obligations, will behave in a predictable
manner, and will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for
opportunism is present. (Zaheer et al., 1998, p.143)
Information sharing is defined as “the extent to which critical,
often proprietary, information is communicated to one's partner
in a timely manner.” (Mohr & Spekman, 1994, p. 139).
Flexibility refers to partners common beliefs about the
appropriate behavior in the case of changes in contractual
agreements. Particularly, willingness to adapt and change
original contract terms, in the face of specific requests of the
other party (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2010; Yilmaz, Sezen, &
Ozdemir, 2005).
A firm's dependence upon an exchange relationship is a function
of the degree to which rewards sought and gained from the
relationship are not available outside of the relationship (Lusch
& Brown, 1996)

Guided by the available literature on relationship exit, we also consider two exogenous factors that
may influence the buyer's choice of relationship exit strategy. The first one is relationship duration,
which refers to the length of the relationship between the buyer and the supplier. It is generally
accepted that relationship closeness evolves over time (Schurr, Hedaa, & Gersbro, 2008), and the
longer the relationship, the more ‘opportunities’ the buyer and the supplier have to develop mutual
understanding, trust and commitment (Dwyer et al., 1987). In consequence, and in line with
suggestions by Giller and Matear (2001), we posit that longer relationships, which are conducive to
relationship closeness, are less likely to result in a self-oriented and abrupt relationship exit.
The second contextual factor that we consider is the size difference between the buyer and the
supplier. Size of the supplier relative to the buyer can be seen as an indicator of a power differential
between the two actors. Large firms tend to have more resources and more buying power, which
makes them less dependent on small suppliers, resulting in power asymmetry. As Gulati et al.
(2008) showed, it is much easier for a large firm to walk away from a relationship with a small supplier
in an abrupt and non-communicated fashion (than the other way around), consequently leaving the
small supplier vulnerable and exposed to financial and operational disruptions.

2.3. Relationship exit strategies and their relationship determinants
Current literature is in broad agreement that characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships affect
relationship exit. Given the multitude of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics, differences in this
consensus start emerging around which relationship characteristics actually play an influencing role on
the choice of relationship exit strategy. A study by Giller and Matear (2001), for example, showed that
prior closeness between the buyer and the supplier, characterized by the presence of trust and social
bonds, will lead the disengager to opt for an other-oriented exit strategy (i.e. silent or negotiated),
whereby it will consider not only its own but also the counterpart's interests. Similarly, Alajoutsijärvi et
al. (2000) showed that presence of social bonds in close buyer-supplier relationships plays an
important role in minimizing potential damage to the counterpart during the disengagement process
and once the exit is completed. This suggests that the disengager will seek to avoid an abrupt and/or
self-oriented relationship ending and will likely behave in accordance with the relational norms and
shared values jointly developed with the supplier prior to the disengagement.
In addition to the consideration of relational characteristics of BSR in the choice of exit, Caniëls and
Gelderman (2010) suggested that high levels of asset specific investments in a relationship will likely
make the buyer seek to negotiate its departure, to protect their investment that would otherwise be
lost with the dissolution of the relationship (Harrison, 2004). This is in contrast to the suggestion
by Giller and Matear (2001), who argue that when a disengager has invested substantial resources in
the relationship and has a lot to lose from the relationships' dissolution, the preferred choice would be
to adopt self-oriented exit strategies (i.e. disguised or communicated), and minimize its own losses. To
add to these contrasting views, research suggests that in highly unbalanced relationships, the less
dependent party will likely choose a self-oriented strategy, knowing that their counterpart has little or
no leverage over them to force the negotiation of exit terms (Gulati et al., 2008; Tähtinen et al., 2007).
While such behavior is economically rational from the disengager's point of view, it can substantially
harm the counterpart, and it is for this reason that the more dependent party should be given an
opportunity to either enter in negotiations over exit terms, or to gain additional time and seek
potential alternatives in sales or supply markets (Gulati et al., 2008).
Moreover, most studies treat individual relationship characteristics (e.g. trust, asset specificity or
dependence) in isolation from each other or describe relationships with high level constructs such as
‘close’ or ‘collaborative’, ignoring their multidimensional nature. In practice, managers rarely seek to
manage a single characteristic of a relationship, but rather struggle with the complexity of multiple
characteristics at once (Zaefarian et al., 2017). Management scholars however (see for
example Siggelkow, 2002; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002), have long recognized that organizational
outcomes (in our case buyer's choice of a kind exit) tend to depend on the alignment or a conflict
among interdependent attributes (in our case relationship dimensions), which commonly occur
together, forming multidimensional constellations or configurations of distinct characteristics
(Misangyi et al., 2017). In line with this, we posit that the effects of relationship characteristics on the
choice of exit strategy may be conjunctural and context-dependent, rather than isolated. In fact,
various equifinal ‘recipes’ for the same outcome (i.e. exit) may exist; while causation may
be asymmetric, with both the presence and the absence of a relationship characteristic (e.g. asset
specificity) being linked to the outcome as part of different configurations. In line with the argument
of Meyer et al. (1993), the number of configurations of distinct conceptual attributes (i.e. relationship

characteristics in our case) is limited and predetermined because of (p. 1176): “the attributes' tendency
to fall into coherent patterns”. Given the limited number of such configurations and their relative
stability over time (Miller, 1986, Miller, 1996), configurational logic helps with their identification and
the elucidation of the complex interactions among the constructs.
Seeing various industrial marketing phenomena as causally complex, and applying configurational logic
to examine them, has already generated fruitful insight that clarifies, or complements, previous insight
coming from traditional correlation-based approaches (e.g. Frösén, Jaakkola, Churakova, & Tikkanen,
2016; Hierati et al., 2019; Karatzas et al., 2016; Zaefarian et al., 2017).
In line with the reviewed literature and the previous works addressing causally complex phenomena
and using a configurational approach (e.g. Ambroise, Prim-Allaz, & Teyssier, 2018; Hughes, Cesinger,
Cheng, Schuessler, & Kraus, 2019; Karatzas et al., 2016), we outline two theoretical conjectures:
1. There will be more than one, qualitatively different, configurations of buyer-supplier
relationship characteristics and contextual factors that lead to a kind exit.
2. The configurations of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics and contextual factors
leading to a kind exit, will more likely reflect relational rather than transactional relationship
properties.

3. Methodology
To identify the configurations of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics that are sufficient for a kind
relationship exit, we employed fsQCA – an analytic technique that is fully equipped to tackle causal
complexity (see Ragin, 2008). Due to its suitability for investigating causally complex phenomena, its
ability to systematize qualitative data analysis and produce insights from quantitative data that
traditional correlational techniques cannot, fsQCA is becoming increasingly popular in various social
sciences. Full explanations of the method include Ragin (2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012),
while detailed empirical expositions in the management, operations, supply chain management, and
marketing disciplines include, among others, Fiss (2011), Karatzas et al. (2016) and Zaefarian et al.
(2017).
Aligned with our research focus, and with previous applications of TCE (e.g. Heide & John,
1990; Terpend, Krause, & Dooley, 2011) and SET (e.g. Huo, Flynn, & Zhao, 2017; Zaheer et al., 1998) in
a buyer-supplier context, the unit of analysis is a terminated buyer–supplier relationship. As detailed
below, the unit of the data collection is a key informant from the buying firm in a BSR. As such, we
solely (but deliberately) capture the buyer's perception of the various relationship dimensions. Since in
our study it is the buyer who chooses to disengage from the relationship, we argue that it is their own
perception of the relationship that influences their choice of exit strategy. With these in mind, our
study design aims at identifying key informants at buying organizations, knowledgeable and
experienced enough to recall the characteristics of a BSR from which their organization recently
disengaged, and in which they were personally involved in managing the exit.

3.1. Sampling and data collection
We obtained data via an online survey which was administered throughout 2015. The instrument was
initially pre–tested by six supply chain and marketing academics and four industry representatives

familiar with exit in BSRs. The pre–test was designed to ensure that the questionnaire was concise and
clear, and that the items provided face validity for the constructs examined. Based on the feedback,
minor changes were made, and the instrument was then converted into an on–line survey. The target
population comprised UK–based manufacturers and service providers operating in a range of sectors.
To cover a range of industries, we purchased two independent databases from mailing list companies,
with an overall of 4815 unique firm-contacts.
The survey respondents we sought were the supply chain managers and purchasing executives of the
buying firms involved in managing exit from a relationship with one of their suppliers. This sampling
criterion ensured that the target respondents possessed the relevant practical knowledge, establishing
them as key informants. Studying BSRs by surveying supply chain managers is a widely accepted
practice in buyer-supplier relationship research (e.g. Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008). A link to the
self–administered online questionnaire was sent to these informants along with a cover letter
highlighting the study's objectives. Target respondents were encouraged to participate by offering
them entitlement to a summary report of the research findings. Participation was voluntary, and
anonymity and confidentiality were assured.
The questionnaire was sent out via electronic emailing in two waves. Initially, 281 responses were
received. After a gap of three weeks, a reminder was sent electronically to those target respondents
that did not respond during the first wave. This resulted in another 53 responses. Data screening
forced us to omit 19 questionnaires due to incomplete information, resulting in 315 usable responses
(6.54% response rate).
Detailed sample composition and profiles of buyers and suppliers are shown in Table 3, Table 4. NES
was the most popular strategy (35.9%) to end a BSR, followed by CES (27.6%), SES (20.3%) and DES
(16.2%). This suggested that the buying firm's choice of exit strategy varied with the complexities faced
by the firm in a particular situation.
Table 3. Sample composition.
Relationship duration (years)
<1
1–2
2–3
3–4
4–5
>5
Total

#
76
101
41
41
36
20
315

%
24.1
32.1
13.0
13.0
11.4
6.4
100.0

Professional profile
Procurement managers

#
224

%
71.1

Supplier rel. managers

79

25.1

Board level executives

12

3.8

315

100

Table 4. Profiles of buyers and suppliers.
Buyers /
supplier
Buyers

Employees #
< 50
51–250
251–500

%

109 34.6
93 29.5
51 16.2

Annual sales
in GBP (mill.)
<1
1–10
10.1–50

#

%

Industry

#

%

124 39.3 Manufacturing 143 45.4
79 25.1 Agriculture
26 8.3
45 14.3 IT & Telecom
25 7.9

Suppliers

501–1000
>1000

30
32

9.5
10.2

Total
< 50
51–250
251–500
501–1000
>1000

315
23
108
96
73
15

100.0
7.3
34.3
30.5
23.1
4.8

Total

315 100.0

> 50

<1
1–10
10.1–50
> 50

67

21.3 Transport
Construction
Electronics
Other
315 100
52 16.5 Manufacturing
91 28.9 Agriculture
87 27.6 IT & Telecom
85 27.0 Transport
Construction
Electronics
Other
315 100

24
13
13
71
315
111
13
25
14
26
18
108
315

7.6
4.1
4.1
22.6
100.0
35.2
4.1
7.9
4.5
8.3
5.7
34.3
100.0

3.2. Measurement development and assessment
Measures for the independent variables (in fsQCA language: casual conditions) were adopted from the
extant literature (see Table 6 in the next section). Regarding the two contextual factors (size and
relationship duration), two ordinal variables were created to operationalize the original categories
(see Table 3, Table 4). As such, relationship duration varied between ‘1’ (corresponding to a
relationship that lasted less than a year) and ‘6’ (representing one that exceeded 5 years), while firm
size had five levels (from ‘1’ if employees <50 to ‘5’ if employees >1000). We decided to use ordinal
scales for relationship duration and size because sometimes respondents do not have the precise
knowledge to respond to a continuous variable. Particularly in the case of relationship duration, where
the relationship could have been in place for many years. However, we acknowledge that we could
have used more granular ordinal scales to improve precision. To capture the buyer's choice of an exit
strategy, four distinct scenario descriptions (see Table 5) were developed from the extant literature
(Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Pressey & Mathews, 2003). The informants were asked to consider a
relationship with a supplier that their firm had recently ended and were allowed to select only one exit
scenario before attempting to answer the remaining questions.
Table 5. Scenario descriptions for dependent variables.
Dependent
variable
Silent exit

Disguised exit

Communicated
exit

Scenario descriptions
We felt no need to communicate with the supplier that we were leaving the
relationships. For example, due to its lack of importance, the relationship with
the supplier just fizzled out.
We did not directly indicate to the supplier our intention to leave the relationship
but deliberately created a situation where the relationship became
unsustainable. For example, we deliberately delayed payments to the supplier.
We informed the supplier that we had decided to end the relationship. For
example, we never wanted to give another chance to the supplier to restore an
unsatisfactory relationship.

Negotiated exit

We negotiated how the relationship should end. For example, both partners (our
company and the supplier) acknowledged that the disengagement was inevitable
and discussed matters with mutual understanding.

3.3. Validity and reliability
We assessed the construct validity and reliability of our measures by following established guidelines
outlined by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 6. All
measurement items had lower loadings on the constructs that they were not supposed to measure,
indicating uni–dimensionality.

Table 6. Constructs and items description.
Item scales

Cronbach's
α
0.946

Asset specificity
AS1
AS2
AS3

We had invested resources to provide our
supplier with customized support.
Our system was tailored to using a particular
product/service of the supplier.
We made investments dedicated to our
relationship with the supplier.

Opportunism
OP1
OP2
OP3
Administrative
control
AC1
AC2
AC3
Transactional
uncertainty
TU1
TU2
TU3

Factor
loading

Heide and John (1990), Zaheer et al.
(1998)
0.785
0.761
0.776

0.812
The supplier altered information in order to
get what they wanted.
The supplier was always sincere with us.
The supplier breached formal agreements for
their own benefit.

Achrol and Gundlach (1999); Caniëls
and Gelderman (2010)
0.830
0.857
0.794

0.930
The supplier demanded detailed contracts
before starting business with us.
Responsibilities of both parties were clearly
specified in a contract.
The supplier sought maximum protection
through a contract with us.

Andaleeb (1995); Caniëls and
Gelderman (2010)
0.840
0.857
0.831

0.902
The supplier provided stable availability of
required product/service.
Working with the supplier was easy.
The supplier provided us products/services in
the required volumes.

Source for scale development

Noordewier et al. (1990) and Zaheer
et al. (1998)
0.879
0.834
0.832

Trust
TR1
TR2
TR3
Information
exchange
IE1
IE2
IE3

0.909
The supplier always negotiated fairly with our
company
The supplier did not keep their promises.
The supplier was trustworthy.

FX3

0.683
0.769
0.815
0.895

We frequently exchanged information with the
supplier.
We exchanged more information than
required with the supplier.
The supplier kept us informed about changes
that may affect us.

Flexibility
FX1
FX2

Rempel and Holmes (1986); Zaheer et
al. (1998)

Heide and John (1992); Caniëls and
Gelderman (2010)
0.867
0.868
0.910

0.889
The supplier responded flexibly.
The supplier adjusted rapidly according to
changing circumstances.
The supplier worked out a new deal when
circumstances changed.

Dependence
DP1
We were dependent on the supplier.
DP2
The supplier was difficult to replace
DP3
The supplier was costly to lose
Note: 7-Point Likert scales were used for all constructs.

Caniëls and Gelderman (2010); Yilmaz
et al. (2005)
0.778
0.806
0.818

0.937

Lusch and Brown (1996); Caniëls and
Gelderman (2010)
0.803
0.827
0.807

In addition, the CR of each construct was greater than the average variance extracted (AVE) value for
the construct, providing evidence of convergent validity. Regarding discriminant validity, the squared
correlation between each construct and other constructs was smaller than the average variance
extracted (AVE) for the construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Moreover, both the maximum shared
variance (MSV) and average shared variance (ASV) of each construct were smaller than its AVE
(see Table 7), further rendering support for discriminant validity (Chae, Choi, & Hur, 2017). Summary
descriptive statistics and correlations can be found in Table 8.
Table 7. Measure of reliability and validity.
Item description
CR
AVE
MSV ASV
Asset specificity
0.817 0.599 0.413 0.266
Opportunistic behaviour 0.867 0.684 0.171 0.075
Administrative control
0.880 0.710 0.283 0.152
Transaction uncertainty 0.885 0.720 0.384 0.161
Trust
0.801 0.574 0.407 0.237
Information sharing
0.830 0.777 0.235 0.042
Flexibility
0.843 0.641 0.377 0.213
Dependence
0.853 0.659 0.413 0.232
CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; MSV = Maximum Shared variance;
ASV = Average Shared Variance.

Table 8. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
1
2
1 Asset specificity
1
2 Opportunistic behavior −0.445** 1
3 Administrative control 0.500** −0.234**
4 Transaction certainty
0.544** −0.373**
5 Trust
0.645** −0.421**
6 Information sharing
0.132** −0.030
7 Flexibility
0.644** −0.478**
8 Dependence
0.726** −0.577**
9 Relationship duration
0.641** −0.377**
10 Size asymmetry
0.091
−0.025
Mean
3.54
4.99
Standard deviation
1.665
0.966
Notes: N = 315; ** p < .01,* p < .05; (two–tailed test).

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1
0.326**
0.302**
0.532**
0.431**
0.430**
0.373**
0.124*
3.95
1.455

1
0.673**
0.038
0.429**
0.542**
0.463**
0.232**
3.41
1.391

1
−0.076
0.551**
0.686**
0.463**
0.196**
3.55
1.285

1
0.118*
0.028
0.108
0.105
2.82
1.098

1
0.705**
0.477**
0.023
3.33
1.248

1
0.515**
0.104
3.35
1.548

1
0.062 1
2.75 0.527
1.545 1.527

3.4. Initial sample analysis
We compared the responses from the two databases (n1 = 178; n2 = 137) to ensure that the samples
came from the same population. There were no statistically significant differences in terms of the
descriptive variables, so we combined the two samples in the analysis.

3.5. Non-response bias and common method variance
We tested for non–response bias by comparing the early (n1 = 270) vs. late (n2 = 45) waves of returned
surveys, assuming that the latter represents the non–respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Chen,
Sohal, & Prajogo, 2013). The two samples did not differ statistically significantly in terms of any
descriptive characteristic, suggesting that non–response bias is not a concern and that the participating
firms represent the population from which they were drawn.
Furthermore, following Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003), we used a combination of ex
ante procedures to reduce the plausibility of method biases as an explanation of the relationships
observed between the constructs of interest (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004). For example, we protected
respondent anonymity, reduced evaluation apprehension, reduced item ambiguity during the pretest
of the data collection instrument (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000), and obtained data from two
independent groups of respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). As the questionnaire was answered by a
single respondent in each company, we also examined common method variance (CMV) at the ex
post stage by employing Harman's single–factor test. An un–rotated factor analysis using the
eigenvalue–greater–than–one criterion revealed eight distinct factors that accounted for 84.97% of the
variance while the first factor captured only 11.59% of the variance, suggesting absence of CMV.

4. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
The two main stages of any fsQCA investigation are the calibration of the raw data, and the
identification of necessary and/or sufficient (configurations of) conditions for a given outcome, which
we present next.

4.1. Measure calibration
An integral step of fsQCA is the transformation of the raw data into fuzzy set membership scores. In
this section, we present the calibration of the outcome (exit strategy), and summarize the process for
the causal conditions in Table 9. An extensive description of the process can be found in Appendix I.

Table 9. Measure calibration specifics.
Outcome

Causal
conditions

Variable name
Type of exit
strategy

Size asymmetry

Relationship
duration
Dependence

Trust
Information
exchange
Transaction
uncertainty
Flexibility
Asset specificity
Opportunism
Administrative
control

Original measure
Four categories (1:
Disguised, 2: Silent,
3. Communicated,
4. Negotiated)
Supplier size minus
buyer size (in
terms of number of
employees band)
Number of years

Corresponding fuzzy set
The set of relationships
dissolving kindly for the
supplier

Type of calibration applied
Direct assignment based on
expert knowledge

Thresholds (if applicable)
N/A

The set of relationships with an
asymmetrically large supplier

Direct calibration

Full Inclusion: 4
Cross-over: 0
Full exclusion: −4

Summed scores (3item Likert scales)

The set of relationships with a
dependent buyer

The set of long relationships

The set of relationships with a
trustful supplier.
The set of relationships with
high levels of information
exchange
The set of relationships with a
supplier that provided high
transaction certainty
The set of relationships with a
highly flexible supplier
The set of relationships with
high asset specificity
The set of relationships with a
highly opportunistic supplier
The set of highly formalized
relationships

Totally fuzzy and relative
(TFR) based on Cheli and
Achille (1995) and Dusa
(2018)

Full inclusion: >5
Cross-over: 3–4
Full exclusion: <1
N/A

4.1.1. Outcome: Relationship exit strategy
There are only four possible relationship exit strategies, hence the outcome variable is categorical in
nature with four possible values. However, as it has already been suggested, the buyer's choice of a
disguised exit strategy could be seen as the least desirable outcome from the supplier's point of view,
while a negotiated exit strategy could be thought of as the most desirable one. It could thus be
assumed that there is an implicit ‘order’ to these four exit strategies, in terms of the degree of harm
they cause the supplier. As such, the variable can be treated as ordinal and reflect exit kindness. To
confirm our theoretical assumption regarding the order of preference of the four exit strategies in
terms of how kind the subsequent exit would be, and transform the variable into a fuzzy set, we
followed a ‘direct assignment’ approach. This makes use of external expert knowledge for assigning
fuzzy set membership scores directly to the raw data (see Verkuilen, 2005). We detail the procedure
below.
We interviewed 20 managers who had experience in business-to-business relationships that had been
terminated, in which their company was the supplier of a product or service to a buyer. We described
the four exit strategies to them, and allowed them to ask any clarification questions. We then asked
them to freely rank the four types in terms of preference, after considering the possibility and severity
of any negative business implications of each type of relationship exit. The implications we asked them
to implicitly consider included the impact on operations (e.g. production disruption, excess inventory),
financial performance (e.g. profitability), market share and reputational damage. The next step
involved the participants declaring their most and least preferred exit types. Having done this, we
asked them to assume that their most preferred strategy took a score of ‘100’ and the least preferred
one took a score of zero. Given that, as a final step we asked them to assign a score from zero to 100 to
the remaining two exit strategies. The level of agreement among the interviewees was almost perfect;
apart from one individual out of the 20, the generated rank order of exit strategies was identical.
Namely, NES > CES > SES > DES. The sole interviewee whose order of preference diverged from this
pattern, considered DES to be more preferable than SES (but only marginally). In line with our prior
theorizing, the generated rank order, and the move from disguised towards a negotiated strategy
suggests a ‘kinder’ exit for the supplier, substantiating our theoretical assumption.
To generate the fuzzy set membership scores of the four strategies, we assigned a value of 0.95 to the
unanimously most preferable exit type (NES) to signify full set membership in the ‘set of relationships
dissolving kindly for the supplier’ (see Ragin, 2008). Similarly, we assigned a value of 0.05 to the least
preferable strategy (DES) to indicate full non-membership in the defined set. To get the fuzzy scores for
the two exit strategy types in-between, for each one we took the average evaluation of the
respondents and divided it by 100. This translated into a score of 0.225 for the silent, and 0.575 for the
communicated exit strategies respectively.

4.2. Configurational analysis
4.2.1. Analysis of necessity
None of the ten causal conditions was found to be necessary for a kind exit, since none of the
respective sets was a consistent superset of the outcome set. This means that there is no condition
that is present in all instances of a kind exit.

4.2.2. Analysis of sufficiency
We used ‘QCA’ (Dusa, 2007), a software package developed for the R environment, because of the
flexibility it provides to conduct the enhanced standard analysis (ESA). This is an extension of
the standard analysis (SA) of Ragin (2008), which removes from the minimisation process untenable
assumptions and incoherent observed configurations (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012), and could
thus be purported to generate more logically and theoretically coherent parsimonious and
intermediate solutions.
The initial step was to construct the truth table and order the configurations according to their
consistency scores. As is customary in large-N fsQCA studies like ours, we chose a frequency threshold
of 2, meaning that no configuration with a single case was taken into consideration, due to their small
empirical relevance. We chose a consistency threshold of 0.97, at a point just before a relatively large
drop in consistency (see Ragin, 2008). Being faithful to the ESA, from the logical reminders to be
included in the minimisation process we removed the contradictory simplifying assumptions (i.e. those
reminders which, during the minimisation, end up being considered sufficient for both the outcome
and its negation). We also removed an empirically observed configuration that is simultaneously a
subset of both the presence and the absence of the outcome (hence, incoherent). The result of the
minimisation is the (enhanced) parsimonious solution. To generate the (enhanced) intermediate
solution, the additional step is to further remove the difficult counterfactuals by postulating directional
expectations for each causal condition. We expect that it is the presence of all conditions, apart from
administrative control and opportunism, that can bring about a kind exit. Reasonably, the less
opportunistic the supplier has been, the more likely is the buyer to take into consideration the
supplier's interests when exiting the relationship, so we expect the absence of this condition to be
associated with the outcome. When it comes to administrative control, the intuition is conflicting; a
relationship primarily governed by formalized contractual agreements may have proven too rigid for
the buyer, but at the same time, the supplier may have been shrewd enough to insert clauses in the
contract prescribing a negotiation stage in case of relationship dissolution. We thus treat
administrative control as ‘neutral’ with regard to the outcome of kind exit.

5. Results
Our analysis uncovered four distinct configurations of BSRs that result in a kind exit. Following the
conventional way to present both intermediate and parsimonious solutions (e.g. Fiss, 2011; Frösén et
al., 2016), the configurations are graphically depicted in Fig. 1. Three of them (configurations 1, 2 and
4) have neutral permutations, i.e. their core conditions (that form the parsimonious solution) are
combined with different sets of contributing conditions. Core conditions are those for which the data
indicate a relatively stronger relationship with the outcome (Fiss, 2011); they are the “decisive causal
ingredients because they do not require any assumptions” (Misangyi et al., 2017: p.276).

Fig. 1. Configurations leading to kind exit.
The overall solution coverage of the intermediate solution indicates that 71.50% of membership in the
outcome set is explained by the four configurations, while the overall solution consistency of 0.94 is
well above the suggested minimum of 0.75 (Ragin, 2008). Solution consistency measures the degree to
which membership in the solution (the set of solution terms) is a subset of membership in the outcome
(Ragin, 2008); the higher the consistency, the more confident one can be that the configurations
reliably lead to the outcome.Note: In configuration 4, the presence of core contributing causal
condition for Transactional uncertainty means the relationship was characterized by high levels of
transaction certainty.

5.1. Configuration 1
The first configuration consists of three core causal conditions: the presence of high flexibility and high
dependence, and the absence of administrative control. These are combined with
three contributing conditions: either the absence of both information exchange and size asymmetry
(Permutation 1a) or the presence of high asset specificity (Permutation 1b).
This configuration showcases the importance of supplier flexibility and buyer's dependence (in the
absence of specific and detailed contracts) for a kind exit. While promising practice suggests that
relationship exit provisions should be an integral part of buyer-supplier contracts, this configuration
suggests that, either this practice is not always followed, and/or buyer-supplier exchanges are simply
not always governed by formalized and detailed contracts. In the absence of these, the supplier could,
in theory, be in the mercy of the buying company as to whether or not they will be informed about the
latter's exit decision and offered an opportunity to part on mutually agreed terms.
However, the buyer's perception of: a) the supplier's flexibility and; b) its dependence on the supplier,
could act as ‘safeguards’ for the buyer not to simply walk away and leave the supplier exposed to

operational, financial and reputational losses. This result suggests that if the buyer thinks that the
supplier has been able to provide them with a unique offering (for example, one that makes the
supplier a single or sole source provider), or, if the supplier represents a relatively large proportion of
the total buyer's spend, it is difficult for the buyer to terminate the relationship solely under their
conditions. Moreover, supplier flexibility, i.e. the ability to adapt in good-faith to changing
circumstances and buyer's needs and wants, is a trait that must have been appreciated by the buyer
throughout the relationship, leading them to reciprocate in the disengagement stage by displaying
interest in the supplier's welfare.

5.2. Configuration 2
The four core conditions of the second configuration are high levels of flexibility, high asset specificity,
high size asymmetry and the absence of opportunism. They are combined with
five contributing conditions: either the absence of administrative control (Permutation 2a) or the
presence of high trust, high information exchange, high dependence and long duration (Permutation
2b). The two permutations reflect two alternative versions of a truly relational relationship between a
large supplier and a considerably smaller buyer.
This configuration suggests that smaller buying firms will inform big suppliers about their exit decision
and engage with them in negotiations, when the buyer has invested in the relationship and when the
buyer believes the supplier has demonstrated flexibility and has not acted opportunistically.
Relationship-specific investments in systems that allow customized support, tailored manufacturing
processes, or integrated logistics, have, in principle, little value outside of a focal relationship. In such
situations, it is logical to expect that a (smaller) buyer is motivated to explore the possibility of
recouping these investments and negotiating a smooth redeployment of resources after the
dissolution of the relationship. This, however, is unlikely to guarantee the desired outcome for the
supplier, since the buyer's investment in the relationship primarily motivates the buyer to secure its
own interests first.
Accompanying core and supporting conditions – i.e. supplier flexibility and absence of opportunism,
combined with characteristics such as trust, information exchange and dependence are indicators of a
long-term and close relationship. Both the buyer and the supplier would have pursued common goals
during the course of the relationship and will consequently try to avoid hurting each other when it
ends. The presence of relational behavior ‘balances’ a buyer's temptation to pursue solely its own
interests in the disengagement phase of the relationship.

5.3. Configuration 3
The third configuration is defined by five core conditions: the absence of trust, information exchange,
administrative control and size asymmetry, and the presence of buyer dependence.
This configuration was somewhat surprising. This is because all the other configurations suggest that it
is the presence (not the absence) of various relational norms that in combination with other conditions
lead to a kind exit. Configuration 3 goes against this logic, suggesting that even a small supplier whose
relationship with the buyer lacks trust, information sharing and contractual safeguards, can still
experience a kind exit, as long as the buyer considers itself to be dependent on the supplier. These are
the cases whereby the buyer may be forced rather than willing to inform, or negotiate with, the

supplier. We can easily imagine such a situation in traditional bottleneck purchasing arrangements
(see Kraljic, 1983), where the buyer is heavily dependent on what can be a relatively small supplier of a
unique technology or service, which the buyer cannot source from elsewhere – at least in the shortterm. The supplier enjoys a dominant position and can charge premium prices, and is unwilling, or
unable, owing to resource constraints, to maintain a close relationship with the buyer. If such a
relationship ends, for example when the buyer develops a secondary source, it may attempt to inform
the supplier and potentially negotiate the provision of goods or services during the transition period,
since it is hard for the buyer to do without these, even in the short term.

5.4. Configuration 4
The fourth and last configuration consists of the following three core conditions: the presence of high
trust, high dependence and high transactional certainty. These were combined with
six contributing conditions: the presence of high flexibility and high asset specificity (Permutation
4a) or high administrative control, asset specificity, size asymmetry, relationship duration, and the
absence of opportunism (Permutation 4b).
This configuration is similar to the second one and illustrates the interplay between the social and
economic dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships. However, it also emphasizes the great
importance of transaction (un)certainty. It suggests that buyers perceive positively those suppliers
which were able to provide them with a stable availability of products/services and reliable order
fulfillment, in an easy-to-work-with manner. The reason for it is that uncertainty created by the
supplier – stemming from its performance, behavior, or volume of supply, requires adaptation and
leads to issues in information processing on the part of the buyer, which may result in a failure to meet
financial and operational targets.
But although the historical transaction certainty is a good indication that the buyer will also consider
the supplier's interests in the exit process, suppliers should not expect this to be enough for a kind exit.
As this configuration suggests, the supplier's ability to provide certainty in the exchange has to be
accompanied by a perceived state of dependence on the supplier, and the supplier's trustworthy
behavior. In a relationship permeated by trust, the buyer seems to maintain the same spirit until the
end of the relationship and reciprocate by offering the supplier a more favorable way out of the
relationship. It is worth noting that the combination of dependence, trust and transaction certainty,
with perceived supplier flexibility and asset specificity, is by orders of magnitude the most empirically
relevant configuration (testified by its high unique coverage). This suggests that most relationships that
ended in a non-harmful manner for the supplier exhibited these characteristics. Reasonably, the buyer
has no reason to not consider the supplier's interest in the disengagement phase (whatever the reason
for that disengagement might be), if the buyer perceived itself to be dependent on that
supplier and felt the supplier exhibited operational certainty, flexibility and trustworthiness.

5.5. Sufficiency analysis for the negation of the outcome
The analysis for the negation of the outcome showed that the absence of relationship duration and the
absence of dependence are necessary conditions for an exit that is not kind for the supplier, with
consistency scores of 0.918 and 0.892 respectively. The relevance and coverage scores (see Dusa,
2018) are very high for the necessity relationship between the absence of dependence and the

negation of the outcome (0.825 and 0.859 respectively), while in the case of duration they can be
considered as borderline acceptable (0.59 and 0.518). These suggest that, for the supplier to be at risk
of being harmed by the dissolution of the BSR, it is necessary that the relationship is short-term and
the buyer does not perceive itself to be dependent on the supplier. In other words, only short-term
relationships with low levels of perceived buyer dependence dissolve in such a way that can harm the
supplier. This however does not mean that a long-term relationship or buyer dependence, by
themselves, are sufficient for a kind exit. As already shown, relational traits have to be in place for this
to happen.
Fig. 2 presents the parsimonious and intermediate solutions for the analysis of sufficiency for the
negation of the outcome. The consistency cut-off was 0.96, with a frequency cut-off of 2 cases.
Configurations with Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) < 0.6 where omitted from the
minimisation process. The results can be readily summarized without getting into the detail of each
configuration: All relationships ending in a way that is possible to harm the supplier do not exhibit
aspects of relational behaviour. This is not a surprise, but it emphasizes even more the importance of
relational relationships for a kind exit. It is encouraging for the suppliers that relationships permeated
by relational norms do not seem to end badly.

Fig. 2. Configurations leading to unkind exit.

6. Discussion
By following configurational logic, this study examined the relationship between the buyer's
perception of its relationship with the supplier and the manner in which their relationship ends once
the buyer has decided to disengage from it. In doing so, this work makes several theoretical and
practical contributions.

Research to date broadly proposes that the characteristics of a buyer-supplier relationship, prior to its
ending stage, determine how the ending of the relationship unfolds (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Halinen
& Tähtinen, 2002; Tähtinen et al., 2007). However, these studies either examine these characteristics
(e.g. trust, dependence, asset specificity) in isolation from each other, or describe buyer-supplier
relationships with high level constructs such as, close, relational or collaborative, ignoring their multidimensionality (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Zaefarian et al., 2017). It is here, where we position our first
theoretical contribution. By positing that the relationship between BSR characteristics, contextual
factors and what we termed kind exit, is causally complex, we departed away from simplistic
descriptions of BSRs, and showed that it is not one single characteristic, but rather, alternative
combinations thereof that lead to the desired outcome. In line with our first theoretical conjecture –
i.e. that more than one, qualitatively different configuration of BSR characteristics and contextual
factors will lead to a kind exit, we uncovered four distinct configurations. Three of those configurations
(1, 2 and 4) exhibit various aspects of relationality, which suggests that for whatever reason the buyer
decides to disengage, out of goodness, reputation or reciprocity for a harmonious relational
relationship, it will consider the supplier's interests at the exit stage and try not to harm them. This is
an important finding, which shows, that the positive effects of close and collaborative buyer-supplier
relationships are not only manifested in the ongoing exchange of a buyer-supplier relationship (Cao &
Zhang, 2011; Dwyer et al., 1987; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hierati et al., 2019), but they also influence the
relationship disengagement stage.
Moreover, we showed that the four configurations leading to a kind exit, consist not only of
relationship characteristics, but also contextual factors, specifically, the relative size of the supplier and
the duration of the relationship. Being larger than the buyer is generally positive but being relatively
smaller is not condemning. Crucially, we found that even asymmetrically small suppliers in
transactional relationships with large buyers, have a chance of exiting a relationship in good terms, as
long as the buyer perceives itself to be dependent on the smaller supplier's offering. Our results also
generated deep and interesting insight about the role of relationship duration. While it is largely
irrelevant for a kind exit, the absence of a long relationship is a very strong indicator of a ‘hard’ exit for
the supplier. Specifically, the analysis for the negation of the outcome suggests that the absence of a
long relationship is a necessary condition for a potentially harmful exit. In other words, only short-term
relationships (which are also perceived by the buyer as non-relational in various ways) end in a way
that could harm the supplier.
Various relational aspects of buyer-supplier relationships (as perceived by the buyer), grounded in both
TCE and SET (i.e. trust, flexibility, information sharing, non-opportunistic behavior and transactional
certainty), on their own do not guarantee the favorable outcome for the supplier, as they almost
always interact with high levels of dependence. It is here where we position our second
theoretical contribution. While the literature, implicitly or explicitly, argues that greater levels of
relationality in buyer-supplier relationships will increase the likelihood that the disengager will consider
the interest of its counterpart (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000; Giller & Matear, 2001; Halinen & Tähtinen,
2002), we showed that the same outcome is possible also in the absence of such relational elements.
Configuration 3 showed that relationships that, from the buyer's perspective, do not exhibit relational
properties do not always imply ‘hard’ exit for a small supplier. In this situation it is a buyer's
dependence on the supplier that counterweighs the absence of perceived relational properties in the

relationship. We argue that the uniqueness of the supplier's offering, relative scarcity of alternative
suppliers on the supply market, or the combination of the two, creates switching difficulties for the
buyer (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; Handley & Benton, 2012). When the buyer's dependence on the
supplier is high, theory suggests that the buyer will have to carefully manage their position to not
become too vulnerable, and will normally place more attention to the quality of the relationship
throughout the exchange with the supplier (Siemieniako & Mitręga, 2018; Tangpong, Michalisin, &
Melcher, 2008). We found that this is also the case in the relationship dissolution stage, through
offering the supplier a kind exit. This insight – i.e. the interaction between the relational elements of
BSR and the buyer's dependence on the supplier, provides an important refinement to our second
theoretical conjecture, where we initially proposed that kind exit is a function of relational rather than
transactional relationship characteristics.
Moreover, the role of buyer's dependence in offering the supplier a kind exit is potentially good news
for small, resource-constrained suppliers that are unable to build complex, close-knitted relationships
with their customers. As long as they are able to provide those customers with an offering that is
unique enough to make them dependent, the risk that the latter will end the relationship overnight
and walk away from their commercial arrangement should decrease. The critical importance of
dependence was further illustrated through the fact that its absence emerged as a necessary condition
for a ‘hard’ exit. Only relationships involving a buyer that does not perceive itself to be dependent on
the supplier end up in a possibly harmful way for the supplier.
This study has also important managerial implications for both buyers and suppliers. While it shows
that there is no single relationship profile leading to a kind exit, it also identifies some key levers that
managers have at their disposal to avoid a hard exit (e.g. dependence, trust, asset specificity,
administrative controls). For suppliers, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with limited
time and resources, the study shows that taking actions to develop buyer dependence, will drastically
decrease the risk associated with the buyer walking away from this relationship in an abrupt and/or
uniformed fashion. In addition, suppliers can seek to build strong relationship through displaying
trustworthy behaviors, flexibility, and providing transactional certainty in order to avoid hard exit.
Results also show that more explicit approaches such as relationship specific investments and imposing
administrative controls (i.e. contractual safeguards) can be effective in decreasing the likelihood of a
hard exit, under certain circumstances. For buyers, the research provides a map showing alternative
routes for supplier disengagement, with the configurations indicating different conditions
underpinning a kind exit. This can help buyers better understand the actions of suppliers. For instance,
a supplier's insistence for asset specific investments or exit clauses in the contract, would be signs of
the supplier's fear of a hard exit and might prompt the buyer to adjust its negotiation strategy.

7. Limitations and further research
Notwithstanding its value for theory and practice, this research has few limitations which offer
opportunities for further research. The first one relates to the focus of the study; we only explored the
role of buyer-supplier relationship characteristics in relationship exit. Literature (e.g. Michalski, 2004)
indicates that exit triggers – i.e. the reasons why a disengager decided to terminate the relationship in
the first place, may also influence the choice of a disengager's exit strategy. This can be either a single
‘catastrophic’ event related to the counterpart's performance or behavior, an accumulation of

unsatisfactory performance and behavior over time, a mutually agreed ending, or an event external to
the relationship – e.g. changes in regulations. Further research should focus on investigating these
reasons and linking them with exit strategy decisions, which should extend the findings of this work.
Second, given the multi-dimensional and context dependent nature of relationship exit and its
determinants, other contextual factors may play a role in a buyer's or supplier's choice of exit strategy.
One interesting contextual factor are cultural characteristics (i.e. country of origin) (Gulati et al.,
2008; Pressey & Qiu, 2007). Given that our data collection was limited to buying firms in the UK and
that we did not account for the country of origin of supplying firms, future research should explore
whether and/or to what extent the choice of relationship exit strategy is influenced by cultural
characteristics of both buying and supplying firms.
Third, our measure of buyer's dependence on the supplier is narrow. Future research could expand this
measure and adopt the construct of relative dependence - the perceived difference between its own
and the partner's dependence on the relationship (see Hocutt, 1998 for further details) or total
interdependence if data is collected from both sides of a dyad (see Caniëls and Gelderman,
2007, Caniëls and Gelderman, 2010 for more further details).

Appendix I. Calibration of the causal conditions
Size asymmetry
An asymmetry in size (in terms of employee number) could imply scale and power asymmetries
between the buyer and the supplier, and differences in the level of professionalism. The mean size
difference between suppliers and buyers was 0.53, suggesting that in this sample, the suppliers, on
average, were slightly larger companies than the buyers. Since employee size was captured as an
ordinal variable with 5 levels, we created a measure of size asymmetry by subtracting buyer size from
supplier size, which could take values from −4 (when a supplier with <50 employees dealt with a buyer
with over 1000 employees) to 4 (when a supplier with over 1000 employees dealt with a buyer of <50).
It was thus intuitive to transform this measure into a fuzzy set (‘the set of relationships with an
asymmetrically large supplier’) using the direct method of calibration and applying the following
thresholds: ‘4’ to indicate full membership in the set, ‘-4’ to indicate full non-membership, and ‘0’ as
the cross-over point (implying size symmetry).
Relationship duration
We transformed relationship duration into ‘the set of long relationships’ using the direct method of
calibration and applying the following thresholds. We used substantive knowledge from the extant
literature on relationship lifetime value and long-term orientation of BSRs (e.g. Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani
& Narayandas, 1995; Reinartz & Kumar, 2003) to designate the cross-over point (i.e. the point of
‘maximum ambiguity’) to be 3–4 years. A relationship less than a year old was deemed to be fully out
of the set, while a relationship of over five years old was considered fully in.
Relationship dimensions
Treating ordinal variables (like Likert scales) as interval ones, and mechanically transforming them into
fuzzy sets is a common practice in the management literature (e.g. Frambach et al., 2016) even though
it is not advisable by fsQCA methodologists (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). As Dusa
(2018) explains, Likert response scales are bipolar in nature, constructed (for example) from a negative

end being ‘strongly disagree’, to a positive end being ‘strongly agree’. In contrast, fuzzy sets are
unipolar; using trust as an example, for the purpose of this work all cases need to be assigned a
membership score in the ‘set of relationships with a trustful supplier’. A mechanical transformation of
a bipolar scale using the midpoint as cross-over, and the endpoints as full inclusion and full exclusion
thresholds is conceptually problematic (Dusa, 2018). More importantly, oftentimes Likert type
variables are skewed towards one of the ends, producing measures where scores are clustered and
variance is small. This could occur because of social desirability bias or because respondents make
implicit causal connections between the different constructs. Granted, having three or more items per
construct and a large sample justifies the treatment of the averages (or summated scores) as interval
variables, but the issues surrounding the calibration of such variables in fsQCA are not guaranteed to
disappear.
To counter this issue, a recent development in the fsQCA literature is to calibrate ordinal (or even
interval) variables using a transformation method that adapts Cheli and Achille's (1995) Totally Fuzzy
and Relative (TFR) approach. This method is based on rank orders and uses the empirical Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of the observed data. The normalised version of the original formula, that
guarantees that values are restricted between 0 and 1, is presented below (see Dusa, 2018).
𝐸(𝑥)−𝐸(1)
(1) 𝑇𝐹𝑅 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0, 1−𝐸(1) )

where E() is the CDF. The formula basically calculates the distance from each value of the CDF to the
CDF of the first value (1) in the Likert response scale and divides that to the distance between 1 (the
maximum possible fuzzy score) and the same CDF of the first value in the same Likert response scale.
This transformation ensures that the resultant fuzzy values are not mechanically spaced equally
between 0 and 1, because they depend on the particular distribution of the observed data. This is very
helpful, giving guaranteed suitable fuzzy scores even for highly skewed data coming from ordinal
scales. We thus adopt this calibration method for all relationship dimensions that have been measured
using 7-point Likert scales, and for each dimension we take the average fuzzy score across its 3 items.
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